Family firms and the divestment decision: An agency perspective by Praet, Alain
Journal of Family Business Strategy xxx (2013) xxx–xxx
G Model
JFBS-88; No. of Pages 8Family firms and the divestment decision: An agency perspective
Alain Praet *
Centre For Informatics, Simulation and Modeling (CIMS), Hogeschool-Universiteit Brussel (HUB), Warmoesberg 26, 1000 Brussels, Belgium
A R T I C L E I N F O
Article history:
Received 25 July 2010
Received in revised form 10 December 2012
Accepted 13 December 2012
Keywords:
Family firms
Divestment
Agency theory
A B S T R A C T
This article examines how ownership, management and governance characteristics and the associated
agency problems of family firms impact the divestment decision. Based on the divestment activity of 48
listed family firms in Belgium over a six-year period, I find an inverse U-shaped relationship between
family ownership and divestment likelihood, supporting the alignment view at medium levels of family
ownership but entrenchment at high ownership levels. In addition to ownership, the governance of the
family firm also impacts the divestment decision. Divestiture likelihood is significantly lower when the
family exerts its influence through the board of directors, consistent with the entrenchment view that
they will use their influence to pursue non-economic goals. Founders, on the other hand, act as active
monitors of the firm’s activities and do not seem to be hindered by emotional considerations which
result in more divestment activity as compared to other family firms.
 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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Although divestitures are complex, high-impact events of great
theoretical and practical interest, many issues still remain
unresolved (Brauer, 2006). Family firms, one of the dominant
organizational forms around the world, have received little
attention in the existing divestiture research. This is quite
surprising since virtually nothing is known of the divestment
processes in family firms where decisions are governed as much by
financial and rational motivations as they are by the emotional
forces and family traditions (Sharma & Manikutty, 2005). Knowing
more about the divestiture process is crucial, though, since the
timely adding to and shedding of the resource inventory is critical
to securing long-term survival and creating a competitive
advantage for family firms (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003).
Furthermore, family firms are characterized by their involve-
ment in ownership, control and management (Villalonga & Amit,
2006). The impact of the family may not only be reflected in the
percentage of shares held, though, but may alternatively or
simultaneously show up in the governance characteristics of the
family firm. Although inadequate governance has been shown to
be an antecedent of divestment intensity in restructuring firms
(Hoskisson, Johnson, & Moesel, 1994), much is still inconclusive
when it comes to the influence exercised by the governance
characteristics on firm behavior (Chatterjee, Harrison, & Bergh,
2003).* Tel.: +32 0 2 609 82 50; fax: +32 0 2 217 64 64.
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfbs.2012.12.002In addition to family ownership, it is also important to consider
how family management impacts the divestment decision.
Villalonga and Amit (2006) found that firm value is destroyed
when descendants of family members serve as CEO. In their
literature review, Sciascia and Mazzola (2008) state that the
evidence is mixed for listed firms.
The theoretical lens used in the paper is agency theory, which is
one of those most frequently applied in divestiture research,
alongside portfolio theory and transaction cost economics (Brauer,
2006). Although this agency perspective has limitations, it is the
dominant perspective in family business research (Pieper, 2010).
Within the agency framework, two competing views have been
developed, the alignment view and the entrenchment view (Wang,
2006). Applying agency theory on family firms allows distinguish-
ing between these two perspectives, given the unique character-
istics of family firms. According to the alignment view, the agency
problems, typically described as a conflict between owners and
managers, will diminish as blockholder ownership increases
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In family-controlled firms this type
of agency conflict would be mitigated due to the families’ greater
incentives to monitor (Villalonga & Amit, 2006).
On the other hand, the entrenchment view is based on the
notion that family firms will be confronted with agency problems
that differ in nature from those in non-family firms (Chrisman,
Chua, & Litz, 2004). As family ownership increases, a conflict may
arise between the family and the minority shareholders (Villalonga
& Amit, 2006). Family relations also tend to make agency problems
associated with owner management more difficult to resolve, due
to self-control (Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, & Buchholtz, 2001). Socio-
emotional wealth considerations may also prevent family firms
from divesting assets (Gomez-Mejia, Haynes, Nunez-Nickel,tment decision: An agency perspective. Journal of Family Business
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conservative behavior and is an exponent of the stagnation
perspective (Miller, Le-Breton-Miller, & Scholnik, 2008). Although
an increased likelihood of divestiture is not necessarily positive,
since overhasty divestitures may harm performance, on average
divestiture actions are associated with positive performance
outcomes for the divesting parent firm (Lee & Madhavan, 2010).
Studying the divestment decision in family firms will thus
reveal whether higher ownership levels and more involvement of
the family in the board or the management align the family’s
interest with those of the other shareholders or are rather used to
entrench themselves. Focusing on the combined impact of family
ownership, governance characteristics and family management on
the divestment likelihood in family firms will also show the
importance of each of those elements in the divestment decision.
Finally, the article also aims to contribute to the existing
divestiture research, since little attention has been paid to the
performance of the divested unit and samples outside the United
States or the United Kingdom (Brauer, 2006).
This article proceeds as follows. First, I describe how family
ownership and control affect the agency problems in family firms
and the consequences for the divestment decision, resulting in an
integrated set of hypotheses. The next sections then describe the
data and the empirical results of the logistic regressions that
estimate the divestment likelihood. Finally, the article ends with a
conclusion, its limitations and directions for future research.
2. Theoretical background and hypotheses development
2.1. Family ownership and control
When families hold a controlling block of shares, this entails
both benefits and costs, dependent on the perspective that is taken.
According to the alignment view, the block of shares held by
families increases their incentive to monitor the firm’s activities
(Demsetz & Lehn, 1985). As a consequence, the traditional agency
conflict between shareholders and management is mitigated in the
case of family ownership (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Furthermore,
family firms have special incentives to effectively manage the
firm’s financial capital (Gallo & Vilaseca, 1996; McConaughy &
Phillips, 1999). This would lead to better performance as family
ownership increases. However, the incentives of the family firm
may alter as the ownership stake increases since socio-emotional
considerations come into play and entrenchment may become
their primary goal. This results in a non-linear relationship
between family ownership and performance, as documented by
Anderson and Reeb (2003) and Andres (2008). Ben-Amar and
Andre´ (2006) also find a non-monotonic relationship between
ownership level and the market’s reaction to acquisition
announcements. They interpret this as evidence of entrenchment
at high levels of ownership.
On the other hand, it is important to consider the separate effect
of family ownership, control and management (Villalonga & Amit,
2006). Usually, families are actively involved in the management
and the governance of the firm (Basu, Dimitrova, & Paeglis, 2009).
Through board representation, through the presence of a family
member as CEO or chairman of the board, families are able to
obtain additional control (Villalonga & Amit, 2009). Governance,
which is reflected in the board characteristics, is primarily an
indirect antecedent of divestiture intensity (Hoskisson et al., 1994).
Families can also exert a great deal of influence by placing one of
their members in the position of CEO (Anderson & Reeb, 2003). The
evidence with respect to the impact of a family CEO has not been
equivocal. On one hand, the presence of a family CEO has a positive
impact on the market return upon the announcement of an
acquisition (Ben-Amar & Andre´, 2006). However, Villalonga andPlease cite this article in press as: Praet, A. Family firms and the dives
Strategy (2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfbs.2012.12.002Amit (2006) find that firm performance suffers when the family
firm is run by a descendant. This could be the consequence of
altruism, which makes entrenchment more likely and prevents the
appointment of a more capable professional manager (Schulze,
Lubatkin, & Dino, 2003).
The appointment of a member of the family as CEO or to a
dominant position in the board will thus enable the family to
pursue its own objectives. These goals can deviate from
maximizing shareholder value, since firm performance may have
a meaning to family firms which goes far beyond the financial
numbers (Sharma & Manikutty, 2005). In the same vein, Zellweger
and Astrachan (2008) stress the importance of considering the
emotional value of family ownership. Consequently, in family
firms, a different type of agency problem may arise, since the
potential conflict now is to be found in the different objectives of
the controlling family and the minority shareholders in the firm
(Faccio, Lang, & Young, 2001; Morck & Yeung, 2003). Family
relations also tend to make agency problems associated with
private ownership and owner management more difficult to
resolve, due to self-control and other problems engendered by
altruism (Schulze et al., 2001).
2.2. Ownership and governance in the family firm and the divestment
decision
Given the diversity of ownership and governance character-
istics within the group of family firms, the question remains as to
how they influence the divestment process. Since decisions within
family firms are governed as much by financial and rational
motivations as they are by emotional forces and family traditions
(Sharma & Manikutty, 2005), ownership levels and the way the
family firm is governed may reflect the emotional involvement of
the family and impact the divestment process accordingly. So, if
the emotional aspects outweigh the purely financial consider-
ations, the entrenchment effect would be dominant, resulting in
lower divestment likelihood.
Earlier evidence by Chrisman et al. (2004) suggests that overall
agency problems in family firms may be less severe than in non-
family firms. So, although emotional aspects may play an
important role in family firms, strategic decisions will be driven
by rational considerations about subsidiaries’ performance and
synergies with other group members. When family ownership is
small, the ownership structure and governance will resemble
those of a non-family firm and the traditional agency conflict
between owners and managers will be predominant (Fama &
Jensen, 1983). Management will have a lot of discretion and most
firms would benefit from refocusing (Chatterjee et al., 2003).
However, as family ownership increases, the monitoring incentive
of the family will increase accordingly and reduce the associated
agency problems (Fama & Jensen, 1983). As a result, the interests
of the managers and family owners will be more aligned and the
family will more readily divest activities that threaten family
wealth or the survival of the family firm. When the level of family
ownership becomes very high, however, the adoption of family-
centered non-economic goals becomes more likely (Chrisman,
Chua, Pearson, & Barnett, 2012). Since family owners obtain non-
pecuniary benefits, they might decide not to divest a subsidiary,
even if it would increase the value of the firm. Even in public firms,
maximizing family utility may dominate the goal of maximizing
firm value (Bertrand & Schoar, 2003). Also, at high levels of
ownership, families can take decisions that are in their best
interest but could be harmful to minority shareholders (Villalonga
& Amit, 2006). Based on the previous arguments, I expect that the
entrenchment view will be most pertinent when the family is
deeply involved in the firm through high ownership levels. These
arguments thus suggest that the alignment effect will be mosttment decision: An agency perspective. Journal of Family Business
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will become dominant at high ownership levels which results in
an inverted U-shaped relationship between divestment likelihood
and family ownership.
Hypothesis 1. There will be an inverted U-shaped relationship
between family ownership and divestment likelihood.
Villalonga and Amit (2006) also note that that family ownership
only creates value when the founder serves as the CEO or as the
chairman of the board with a hired CEO. The first generation also
benefits from less severe agency problems (Blanco-Mazagatos, de
Quevedo-Puente, & Castrillo, 2007). This stems from the fact that
ownership will normally be concentrated in the nuclear family
which provides a strong incentive to maximize shareholder value.
So founders will monitor activities more intensively than family
firms where the founder is not present and will thus engage in
more divestment activity. On the other hand, the founder may be
willing to incur a great performance hazard in order to protect the
level of socio-emotional wealth which will be high at this stage
(Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). However, since performance is only
one factor in the divestment decision and given the more risk-
averse and conservative behavior in case the firm goes from the
first to the next generation (Molly, Laveren, & Deloof, 2010), family
firms where the founder is still present will be more likely to divest
activities as compared to other family firms.
Hypothesis 2. Family firms in which the founder is still active are
expected to be more likely to divest than other family firms.
Besides the presence of the founder, agency costs within family
firms will also depend on the involvement of the family in
management, which reflects family participation in strategic
decision-making (Sciascia & Mazzola, 2008). Anderson and Reeb
(2003) find that active family involvement in management
positions is associated with improved firm performance. Barontini
and Caprio (2006), on the other hand, find that family firms where
a descendant takes the position of CEO have similar valuation and
performance to non-family firms. The importance of active family
involvement is also stressed by Maury (2006), who states that
active family control is associated with higher profitability as
compared to non-family firms. Andres (2008) finds that out-
performance by family firms is most pronounced in those firms
where the family plays an active role. So when a family member
occupies the CEO position, it can be expected that the firm’s
activities will be scrutinized more intensively. In summary,
empirical evidence is relatively consistent with the alignment
effect which implies that the presence of family members in a
management position will increase the divestment likelihood.
Hypothesis 3a. Divestment likelihood in family firms in which a
member of the family occupies the position of CEO is expected to
be higher than in other family firms if the alignment hypothesis
holds.
On the other hand, agency problems rooted in altruism and self-
control are exacerbated when the privileges of ownership place
control of the firm’s resources at the CEO’s discretion (Schulze
et al., 2001, 2003). These privileges create a variety of agency costs
that can increase the need to monitor the work of family agents.
Altruism also reduces the CEO’s ability to effectively monitor and
discipline family agents. Furthermore, at high ownership levels
managerial entrenchment may prevent value-increasing decisions
(Morck & Yeung, 2003). An entrenched family CEO could thus be
reluctant to divest, since the reduced level of business complexity
would weaken his job security. Following Sirmon and Hitt (2003),
it can also be argued that family firm’s managers will be less
likely than non-family managers to make appropriate sheddingPlease cite this article in press as: Praet, A. Family firms and the dives
Strategy (2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfbs.2012.12.002decisions, due to the emotional ties, nostalgia and/or escalation of
commitment related to their unique social and human capital. The
alignment effect of family involvement in management may thus
be offset by the entrenchment effect induced by altruism and
nepotism.
Hypothesis 3b. Divestment likelihood in family firms in which a
member of the family occupies the position of CEO is expected to
be lower than in other family firms if the entrenchment hypothesis
holds.
Similarly, monitoring management by the owning family will
also occur through the board of directors. Villalonga and Amit
(2006) show that family firms with the founder as chairman of the
board have the highest firm performance whereas the lowest
performance is observed for firms in which a descendant occupies
the position of chairman. However, Miller, Le Breton-Miller, Lester,
and Cannella (2007) show that when lone-founders are removed
from a sample of family firms, there is no longer evidence of
superior market valuation. So although agency problems could be
fewer when a member of the family holds the position of chairman,
allowing the family to align its interests with those of the
management, this does not result in a superior performance as
compared to non-family firms. This could follow from the family’s
desire to pursue non-financial goals, as has been shown by e.g.
Astrachan and Jaskiewicz (2008), Gomez-Mejia et al. (2007) and
Zellweger and Astrachan (2008). Maximizing family utility instead
of firm value can thus be expected, even for public firms (Bertrand
& Schoar, 2006). This entrenchment effect can be expected to be
more pronounced as the percentage of family members on the
board increases, since this will allow the family to impose its
preferences. Divestitures would thus become less likely if the
family appoints the chairman or as more family members occupy
board positions.
Hypothesis 4a. Family firms in which the chairman of the board is
a family member will have lower divestment likelihood than other
family firms.
Hypothesis 4b. Divestment likelihood and the percentage of fam-
ily board members on the board will be negatively related.
Finally, according to agency theory, the monitoring function
may be hampered when the same person holds the position of
chairman of the board and CEO. Lack of CEO duality is associated
with a more independent board and is expected to lead to more
vigilant monitoring (Chatterjee et al., 2003). Empirical support
for this proposition is provided by Yermack (1996) who
documents that large industrial companies with a non-CEO
chairman trade at higher price-to-book multiples. A meta-
analysis of Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, and Johnson (1998) does not
confirm the agency view, though, since it does not show any
significant relationship between board leadership structure and
firm performance. Miller et al. (2007) also find no evidence that
family firms, where a family member is both CEO and chairman,
exhibit lower performance levels. On the other hand, when the
same family member holds both the position of CEO and
chairman, this will indicate a high level of family influence on
the firm’s strategy. This would allow the family to pursue non-
financial objectives which would lead to less divestment activity
to protect their socio-emotional wealth. Therefore, when the
positions of chairman of the board and CEO are bestowed on
the same individual in family firms, the entrenchment motive
will be most prominent and divestment likelihood can be
expected to be lower.
Hypothesis 5. Family firms characterized by CEO duality will have
lower divestment likelihood as compared to other family firms.tment decision: An agency perspective. Journal of Family Business
ess Strategy xxx (2013) xxx–xxx
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3.1. Data
To explore how ownership, governance and family manage-
ment affect divestment likelihood in listed family firms, a list of
listed firms, as provided by the Statistics Department of the
Brussels Stock Exchange, was made. To be included in the sample,
the listed firms were required to have balance sheet data and data
on their subsidiaries available with the ‘Balanscentrale’ for at least
three years. The ‘Balanscentrale’ contains balance sheet data and
profit and loss data in accordance with the Royal Decree of January
30, 20011 for all listed and non-listed non-financial companies in
Belgium. This results in a total number of 133 listed firms, which
include companies that have been delisted before 1996 to avoid a
survivorship bias. Since banks and insurance companies are not
obliged to publish their balance sheet data in the ‘Balanscentrale’
and given that listed banks and insurance companies are rarely
family-owned, these firms are not included in the sample.
Companies in liquidation are also excluded. The sample was
further reduced because of the requirement that only listed firms
holding a majority of the cash flow rights in non-financial
subsidiaries were to be considered. This resulted in a final number
of 87 listed firms. Data on the percentage held by blockholders in
the listed firm were provided by the Statistics Department of the
Brussels Stock Exchange.2
Afterwards, for each of these listed firms, the ultimate owner
was initially identified following the methodology proposed by
Renneboog (2000). When at least 10% of the shares were in the
hands of families and the family was the dominant shareholder in
the firm, it was considered to be family-owned. As a result a final
sample of 48 listed family firms was obtained. Based on the
notifications in accordance with the ‘Ownership Disclosure
Regulation’, the median family owned 50% of the voting rights
as of 1991. The minimum percentage held by families was 13.75%.3
In addition, for these listed family firms, information was collected
in the annual reports and newspaper articles to verify whether the
founder was still active in the firm. At the same time, the
composition of the board in each year was examined to verify
whether the CEO or the chairman of the board was a family
member and the percentage of family members on the board was
calculated.
To verify whether the listed family firm was involved in a
divestment of a subsidiary in a particular year, I proceeded as
follows. First of all, using the ‘Balanscentrale’ a list was made of all
majority holdings for the listed family firms between 1991 and
1996.4 Subsequently, to identify the divested subsidiaries, for each
listed company in the period considered a list was made of all
subsidiaries no longer mentioned, which implies that they were
either sold or liquidated. This procedure generated 251 subsidiaries
A. Praet / Journal of Family Busin41 Royal Decree ‘‘tot uitvoering van het Wetboek van vennootschappen’’.
Previously, the Royal Decree of October 8, 1976.
2 Following the law of March 22, 1989, called the ‘‘Ownership Disclosure Law’’,
investors have to make a notification to the Banking Commission (similar to the
American SEC) if their voting rights reach a level of 5% in a company whose
securities are traded on a stock exchange located in the European Union.
3 An exception is Delhaize for which no notifications are made. Still the company
is considered to be family-owned since press articles indicate that the family held
approximately 35% of the shares in the 90s. The family does not act as a syndicate,
though, which relieves it from the obligation to make a notification. Additionally
the annual report of 1998 indicates that descendants of the founders occupy 8 of the
10 board seats and the position of CEO.
4 The ‘Balanscentrale’ mentions minority as well as majority stakes. Although I
had ownership data going back as far as 1986, balance sheet and income statement
data were only available for the firms divested or liquidated from 1991 on. The data
were available from the research I did for my PhD and were hand collected.
Additionally, the period was interesting since it was the period used by a lot of US
studies on divestitures (e.g. Bates, 2005).
Please cite this article in press as: Praet, A. Family firms and the dives
Strategy (2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfbs.2012.12.002of family firms, of which 89 were divested by the listed family firms.
When a listed family firm divested at least one subsidiary in a
particular year, it was defined as being involved in a divestment.
Data for the listed companies and their subsidiaries were obtained
from the database of the National Bank, called ‘Balanscentrale’.
3.2. Control variables
Since the firm- and unit-specific determinants of divestitures
have been studied extensively in the strategic and financial
literature, several control variables will be included in the logit
regressions. A first determinant of divestitures that emerges from
the literature is the presence of financial constraints (John, Lang, &
Netter, 1992; Kang & Shivdasani, 1997; Lang, Poulsen, & Stulz,
1995). Given a family’s desire to maintain control of the firm and
preserve it as a legacy for future generations (Gomez-Mejia et al.,
2007), badly performing subsidiaries that threaten the survival of
the family firm, will be more likely to be divested. To verify the
impact of financial constraints and performance on the divestment
likelihood, the median ratio of operating cash flow to total assets
(CF) for the listed firm’s subsidiaries is included.
An alternative explanation for the divestiture activity observed
states that increasing focus motivates divestitures (Comment &
Jarrell, 1995; John & Ofek, 1995; Wernerfelt & Montgomery, 1988).
Since unrelated assets may interfere with the seller’s other assets,
eliminating the resulting negative synergies leads to higher focus
and better performance of the remaining assets. Additionally,
Miller, Le Breton-Miller, and Lester (2010) argue that diversifying
acquisitions need not be tightly integrated into a treasured legacy
business. So divesting unrelated activities will only have a minor
effect on the strategic focus and the corporate culture, which are
key concerns to family firms (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2005). To
control for the focus motive, a variable is included that measures
how diversified a listed firm is based on the 2-digit NACE code of its
subsidiaries (DIVERSIF). The NACE-code of all subsidiaries was
collected from the ‘Balanscentrale’.5
Two additional control variables are included in the regressions.
First of all, a variable is included that proxies the size of the listed
family firm. Since Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) and Schlinge-
mann, Stulz, and Walkling (2002) find that relatively small
segments are more likely to be divested, I include the median
logarithm of total assets of the family firm’s subsidiaries (SIZE) as a
control variable. I also control for the age of the listed family firm
by a binary variable (AGE) that has a value of 1 in case the family
firm is less than 50 years old. Finally, all regressions include year
and sector dummies but these coefficients are not reported for the
sake of brevity.
3.3. Descriptive statistics and methodology
To verify the impact of ownership and governance character-
istics of listed family firms on the likelihood that a subsidiary will
be divested, logistic regressions are carried out. The dependent
variable in the regressions is a binary variable that has a value of 1
if one or more subsidiaries are divested in the following year and 0
otherwise (DIVEST). As can be concluded from Table 1, family
ownership (FAMOWN) was slightly higher than 50% in the median
family firm. Additionally, the founder (FOUNDER) was present in
about one-fourth of the family firms. With respect to the
governance characteristics of the family firms, Table 1 shows
that the family occupies, in approximately 70% of the family firms,
the position of CEO (FAMCEO) or chairman of the board
(FAMCHAIRMAN). In about one-third of the firms both positions5 The NACE-code consists of 4 digits, is similar to the SIC-code and allows a sector
classification for the subsidiaries.
tment decision: An agency perspective. Journal of Family Business
Table 1
Correlation matrix of family firm characteristics.
DIVEST CF SIZE DIVERSIF AGE FAMOWN FOUNDER FAMCEO FAM-
CHAIRMAN
%FAM_ON_
BOARD
FAMCEO =
CHAIRMAN
DIVEST 1
CF 0.1262* 1
SIZE 0.0955 0.1024 1
DIVERSIF 0.2339*** 0.0843 0.0907 1
AGE 0.0269 0.0488 0.0327 0.1078 1
FAMOWN 0.0199 0.0812 0.1143? 0.2358*** 0.2083** 1
FOUNDER 0.1051? 0.0081 0.1828** 0.0489 0.4971*** 0.2378*** 1
FAMCEO 0.1019 0.1551** 0.0299 0.0697 0.2006** 0.0441 0.0216 1
FAM-CHAIRMAN 0.1635** 0.2553*** 0.0131 0.1201* 0.1814** 0.1540*** 0.2016** 0.2082** 1
%FAM_ON_BOARD 0.1855** 0.2966*** 0.1621* 0.1416* 0.0332 0.0711 0.1007? 0.3199*** 0.3550*** 1
FAMCEO = CHAIRMAN 0.0271 0.0090 0.0135 0.1183* 0.2627*** 0.1242* 0.2310*** 0.5301*** 0.4258*** 0.1228* 1
Mean 0.2015 0.0563 12.3064 0.4520 0.3172 47.3581 0.2345 0.6655 0.7552 0.3752 0.3586
Median 0 0.0454 5.3614 0.5 0 50.01 0 1 1 0.3333 0
STDDEV 0.4019 0.0742 1.3677 0.3583 0.4662 20.5117 0.4244 0.4726 0.4307 0.2185 0.4804
? Significance at the 10% level.
* Significance at 5% level.
** Significance at 1% level.
*** Significance at less than 0.01%.
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family also holds one-third of the board seats in the median family
firm (%FAM_ON_BOARD).
The correlation coefficients in Table 1 show that the divestment
variable is positively related to the presence of the founder in a
significant way, but has no significant correlation with family
ownership. In the group of governance variables, only the presence
of a family chairman and the percentage of family members on the
board show a significantly negative correlation with the divest-
ment variable. Similarly, significantly negative correlations are
presented between the divestment variable and the median
subsidiaries’ cash flow to total assets ratio. The ownership variable
is positively related to the presence of a founder in a significant
way, but is negatively related to having a family member as
chairman. Having a family CEO is also positively related to having a
family chairman, having more family members on the board and
having CEO duality in a significant way.
4. Empirical results
To examine whether the percentage of shares held by the family
significantly affects the divestment likelihood, the logistic regres-
sion in column 1 of Table 2 includes a variable which measures the
percentage of shares held by the family (FAMOWN). The parameter
estimate shows that divestment likelihood increases as families
hold more shares, but the effect is not significant. To test for
potential nonlinear effects, the squared term of the percentage of
shares held by the family is added to the regressions in column 2
(FAMOWNSQR). The estimates show that divestment likelihood
increases until the family holds a majority stake, but decreases
afterwards when family ownership is very high. This can also be
ascertained from Fig. 1 which shows an inverse U-shaped
relationship between divestment likelihood and family ownership.
Divestment likelihood increases to a maximum of 53.28% when the
family owns 57% of the shares, but decreases when the family owns
a larger ownership stake.
With respect to the control variables, the results in the first two
columns of Table 2 confirm that lower profitability and a higher
degree of diversification induce families to divest one or more
subsidiaries the year afterwards. In each of the other logistic
regressions these results stay qualitatively the same. Also, as the
size of the median subsidiary increases, the divestment likelihood
decreases in most regressions. Young family firms are also less
likely to divest a subsidiary.Please cite this article in press as: Praet, A. Family firms and the dives
Strategy (2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfbs.2012.12.002To verify whether the presence of the founder will lead to an
increased divestment likelihood because of his superior monitor-
ing ability or whether socio-emotional wealth considerations will
dominate in the divestment decision, a dummy variable for this
type of family firms is added in column 3 (FOUNDER). As expected,
family firms have a significantly higher likelihood of divesting a
subsidiary when the founder is present.
Besides through its ownership, the family can also exert its
influence through the management or the governance of the family
firm. When the CEO is a member of the controlling family, this may
indicate increased alignment between management and share-
holders or entrenchment. To verify which view holds, a dummy
variable was added for those family firms where the CEO belongs to
the family (FAMCEO). To distinguish the effect of a family member
being CEO from the effect of the founder in the position of CEO, an
additional dummy variable was added (FOUNDERCEO). The
logistic regression results in column 4 of Table 2 reveal that a
family member as CEO has a negative effect on divestment
likelihood while a founder CEO has a positive effect, but this effect
is in neither case significant.
Similarly, the impact of the presence of a family member as
chairman of the board (FAMCHAIRMAN) on the divestment
decision is investigated. Again a distinction is made dependent
on whether the founder is the chairman (FOUNDERCHAIRMAN) or
not. Column 5 of Table 2 reveals that a firm is significantly less
likely to divest a subsidiary when the chairman of the board
belongs to the controlling family, as was expected in Hypothesis
4a. At the same time, when the founder is the chairman of the
board, divestment probability is significantly higher as compared
to family firms where an outsider holds the position of chairman.
When all variables are at their median level, the probability of a
divestiture is 79.80% when the chairman is an outsider but only
59.27% when the chairman is a family member. When the founder
is the chairman on the other hand, divestment likelihood increases
to 92.03%, again confirming the founder’s role as a non-emotional
guardian of firm value.
Similarly, column 6 of Table 2 reveals that divestment
likelihood decreases significantly as the family occupies a larger
percentage of the board seats. However, in family firms where the
founder is present, no significant effect of family members on the
board can be detected.
Finally, the monitoring function may be hampered when the
same family member is both chairman of the board and CEO. The
results in column 7 of Table 2 do not confirm the argument basedtment decision: An agency perspective. Journal of Family Business
Table 2
Logit regressions relating family firm characteristics to divestment activity logit regression where the dependent variable takes the value of 1 when one ore more subsidiaries
are divested the next year and 0 otherwise. CONSTANT is the intercept of the logit regression. CF is the median ratio of the subsidiaries’ operating cash flow scaled by total
assets, SIZE is the median of the logarithm of total assets of the subsidiaries, DIVERSIF is a variable that measures the degree of diversification of the listed firms based on the
number of industries it is active in, using the NACE sector code, AGE is a binary variable with a value of 1 if the listed firm is less than 50 years old, FAMOWN is the percentage
of the shares owned by the family, FAMOWNSQR is the square of the family’s ownership stake, FOUNDER is a binary variable with a value of 1 when the founder is still active in
the family firm, FAMCEO is a binary variable with a value of 1 when the CEO of the family firm is a member of the family, FAMCEO is a binary variable with a value of 1 if the
founder is CEO, FAMCHAIRMAN is a binary variable with a value of 1 when the chairman of the board of the family firm is a member of the family, FOUNDERCHAIRMAN is a
binary variable with a value of 1 when the founder is chairman of the board, %FAM_ON_BOARD is the percentage of family members in the board of directors,
%FAM_ON_BOARD & FOUNDER is the percentage of family members in the board of directors in family firms where the founder is present, FAMCEO = CHAIRMAN is a binary
variable with a value of 1 when the same family member occupies the position of chairman of the board and the position of CEO in the family firm. The Wald Chi-square of the
coefficients is mentioned in brackets. N8Obs is the number of observations used in the logit regression.
DIVEST DIVEST DIVEST DIVEST DIVEST DIVEST DIVEST
CONSTANT 1.2319
(0.5948)
1.8029
(1.1313)
0.8383
(0.2371)
0.4683
(0.0707)
0.3678
(0.0414)
0.0808
(0.0019)
2.2417
(1.5748)
CF 5.6251
(5.1072)*
5.938
(5.6107)*
5.9902
(5.4621)*
6.0424
(5.3729)*
4.9661
(3.3074)?
4.2913
(2.4252)
5.9626
(5.6679)*
SIZE 0.1275
(0.9992)
0.1726
(1.7564)
0.2997
(4.6944)*
0.2386
(3.1059)?
0.2647
(3.9355)*
0.2976
(4.6528)*
0.1813
(1.8969)
DIVERSIF 2.5622
(15.4832)***
2.4338
(13.861)**
2.7942
(17.0698)***
2.5640
(15.2089)***
2.8475
(16.122)***
2.6271
(15.6088)***
2.6053
(14.7972)***
AGE 0.0438
(0.014)
0.0786
(0.0431)
0.7586
(2.824)?
0.3997
(0.8633)
0.9606
(3.5715)?
0.8730
(3.6223)?
0.2159
(0.2879)
FAMOWN 0.0108
(1.3293)
0.0703
(3.2561)?
0.0845
(4.1844)*
0.0630
(2.5558)
0.0816
(3.7665)?
0.1206
(6.7712)**
0.0831
(3.8424)*
FAMOWNSQR 0.00062
(2.5849)
0.0008
(3.6529)?
0.0006
(2.4063)
0.00082
(4.0195)*
0.0012
(6.7575)**
0.0007
(3.0548)?
FOUNDER 1.5627
(10.054)**
FAMCEO 0.6088
(2.4604)
FOUNDER CEO 0.8099
(1.9618)
FAM-CHAIRMAN 0.9987
(5.1408)*
FOUNDERCHAIRMAN 1.0733
(3.1180)?
%FAM_ON_BOARD 4.2195
(13.7061)**
%FAM_ON_BOARD & FOUNDER 0.0588
(0.0025)
FAMCEO = CHAIRMAN 0.4235
(1.1262)
N8Obs 250 250 250 250 250 250 250
Chi-square 25.0509*** 27.9857*** 38.2460*** 35.2542*** 42.0566*** 47.6463*** 29.1131***
? Significance at the 10% level.
* Significance at 5% level.
** Significance at 1% level.
*** Significance at less than 0.01%.
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JFBS-88; No. of Pages 8on agency theory that monitoring will happen more efficiently
when the chairman is not the CEO. Although divestment likelihood
is higher in the event that the function of CEO and chairman is
bestowed by the same person, the difference is not statistically
significant, contrary to the expectation of Hypothesis 5. AlthoughFig. 1. The relationship between family ownership and divestment probability.
Please cite this article in press as: Praet, A. Family firms and the dives
Strategy (2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfbs.2012.12.002the family increases its potential to influence the firm’s strategy
through the function of CEO and chairman, no evidence is found for
lower divestment likelihood.
5. Discussion and conclusion
This article has shown that both ownership and governance
characteristics and the associated agency problems within the
group of family firms have a significant impact on the decision to
divest one or more subsidiaries.
On one hand, the level of family influence will depend on the
families’ level of ownership. As family ownership increases, the
divestment likelihood increases also, consistent with the align-
ment view. However, when family ownership becomes very high,
divestment likelihood decreases which supports the entrench-
ment view. This means that increasing the level of ownership
initially provides an incentive to the family to monitor more
intensively, but at high levels of ownership the family will pursue
its own objectives and avoid divestments to protect its socio-
emotional wealth. This curvilinear relationship between owner-
ship and divestment probability thus adds to the growing
evidence of nonlinear relationships between family ownership
and performance (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Sciascia & Mazzola,tment decision: An agency perspective. Journal of Family Business
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JFBS-88; No. of Pages 82008), family ownership and international entrepreneurship
(Sciascia, Mazzola, Astrachan, & Pieper, 2012) and the dispersion
of ownership among directors in family firms and the use of debt
(Schulze et al., 2003).
It is also interesting to note that the founder clearly has different
objectives as compared to other family firms. Consistent with
Hypothesis 2 and the earlier evidence that founders outperform
other types of family firms (Miller et al., 2007, Villalonga & Amit,
2006), I find that founders are more likely to divest a subsidiary. So
founders appear to have superior monitoring abilities and the
alignment view is supported. They will intervene sooner when
things are going the wrong way, contrary to the expectation that
emotional attachment to the activities they started would prohibit
divestment. When control is in the hands of descendants,
organizational changes by means of divestitures become less likely.
Besides ownership, divestment likelihood may also depend on
the involvement by the family in the management of the firm.
However, the results show that when the CEO is a family member,
this does not seem to impact the divestment decision. Although the
results support the entrenchment view when a family member is
the CEO, consistent with the propositions of Sirmon and Hitt
(2003), the coefficient is not significant. Non-founder CEOs that are
also family members thus seem to have no disadvantage relative to
hired CEOs and do not differ in their monitoring ability from non-
family CEOs. Although occupying the CEO position increases the
control of the family over the firm, there is only weak evidence
that they will use their power to pursue non-economic goals.
When the founder is the CEO on the other hand, the results are
supportive of the alignment view, although again the coefficient is
not significant.
Finally, besides ownership and management, the way the
family governs the firm also significantly impacts the strategic
decisions. The results show that the family will exert its influence,
and its desire to preserve the socio-emotional wealth of the family,
mainly through the board of directors. When the family holds the
position of chairman of the board or as the family occupies more
board seats, it will reduce the divestment likelihood as expected in
Hypotheses 4a and 4b. Scrutinizing managers’ behavior thus
happens more adequately when an external chairman is hired
since the family appears to use its influence to hold on to activities
for non-financial reasons. The board thus seems to be an
instrument for the family to exert its influence and maximize
family utility in public firms, as suggested by Bertrand and Schoar
(2006), and entrench themselves. Again, the situation is different
when the founder is involved. When the founder is present and
occupies the position of chairman, divestment likelihood is
significantly higher while no significant effect of the percentage
of family members on the board is observed.
The article thus contributes to the scarce evidence on the
divestment decision in family firms and disentangles the
alignment view from the entrenchment view within the agency
framework. It demonstrates that the alignment view is most
pertinent at moderate levels of family ownership and when the
founder is still present in the family firm. At very high ownership
levels and when the percentage of family members on the board
increases, entrenchment becomes the dominant motive. This is in
line with earlier evidence by Ben-Amar and Andre´ (2006) on the
entrenchment effect in case of acquisitions. The article also
considers not only ownership as exercised by the family but also
the management and governance characteristics of the listed
family firms. It thus adds to the discussion about the channels
through which the families influence strategic decisions in firms.
The results show that the board of directors is the main instrument,
rather than the CEO position, to influence the strategic decision in
Belgian listed family firms. The results also confirm earlier
evidence that founders play a unique role and have capabilitiesPlease cite this article in press as: Praet, A. Family firms and the dives
Strategy (2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfbs.2012.12.002that should be fostered. That way, the article contributes to the
need for a deepened understanding about the divestment decision
in family firms outside the US or UK.
Notwithstanding its contribution, the article also has some
limitations that at the same time provide avenues for future
research. The focus of this study on Belgium and the use of a six-
year period make it necessary to validate these results for other
countries and for other time periods. In this respect, future
research might investigate how the financial crisis has influenced
the governance of listed family firms and the divestment decisions
taken. It is unclear whether the tendency of a family to pursue non-
financial objectives and entrench themselves will continue to be
equally important in times of financial distress. So, not only the
subsidiaries’ financial situation but also the parent firm’s
characteristics might influence the divestment decision.
Moreover, since this study focused on publicly listed family
firms, it would be interesting to see whether the results obtained
here also hold in non-listed firms. Since non-listed firms are not
subject to capital market scrutiny, socio-emotional considerations
could be expected to influence the divestment decision to a large
extent. Focusing on how the family influences the strategic
decisions, through its presence in management or through the
board of directors, could be a fruitful avenue for future research.
Similarly, a comparison between the divestment decision in family
firms and non-family firms and the factors that have an impact on
it, could add to the research that investigates the differences
between those type of firms.
Also, in the regressions the assumption was made that the
decision to divest a subsidiary was based on the previous year’s
characteristics, but in reality it is likely that performance over a
longer time period will be considered. A case-study approach on
the different steps in the divestment process in listed as well as
non-listed family firms could reveal new insights in this issue.
Additionally, besides the governance characteristics considered
here, other governance measures and their impact on the
divestment decision could be investigated. Including the owner-
ship of the board members and the CEO or the degree of ownership
concentration could add to the existing evidence on the relevance
of these factors (Bergh, 1995). Finally, this study focused on
divestitures as a restructuring strategy, but it is clear that families
can also choose different forms of reorganization. Future research
therefore could consider the different alternatives available and
how families choose between them.
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